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PROCEDURAL AND EVIDENTIARY 
HURDLES IN PONZI SCHEME LITIGATION 
SHARON Z. WEISS & NATALIE B. DAGHBANDAN* 
INTRODUCTION 
The unfortunate reality that comes with a Ponzi scheme case in 
bankruptcy is a mass of deceived unsecured creditors clamoring for their 
money back, and few, if any, present assets within the bankruptcy estate 
with which to pay them.  The sheer size of most Ponzi schemes cases 
necessarily presents unique evidentiary, procedural and administrative 
challenges to professionals seeking to sort out the failed Ponzi enterprise.  
Ponzi scheme cases are riddled with litigation, which generally falls into 
four categories: (1) litigation against the Ponzi scheme operator(s), (2) 
litigation against parties who enabled the scheme to continue (such as 
professionals), (3) litigation to recover assets (such as legitimate 
accounts receivable or proceeds from the sale of property), and (4) 
avoidance actions against those who received property from the Ponzi 
scheme.  This fourth category (and sometimes the third) may involve 
hundreds of defendants, who may be located throughout the country (or 
even the world). 
This Article provides strategic suggestions and practical 
applications for Ponzi scheme litigation, including filing a procedures 
motion, seeking substantive or administrative consolidation, and utilizing 
and overcoming evidentiary hurdles. 
* Sharon Z. Weiss is a partner in the Santa Monica office of Bryan Cave LLP, and Natalie 
B. Daghbandan is an associate in the Los Angeles office.  They are both members of the firm’s 
Bankruptcy Restructuring and Creditors’ Right Client Service group.  The authors acknowledge and 
appreciate the efforts of Golden Gate University School of Law to this Article. 
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I. AVAILABILITY OF PROCEDURE ORDERS 
When confronting a Ponzi scheme case in bankruptcy, counsel may 
petition the court for an order modifying the time otherwise applicable to 
various procedural requirements.  This petition will likely appeal to the 
reason of those professionals involved, due to the immense volume of 
adversary proceedings likely to arise in a Ponzi environment.  Ponzi 
schemes typically give rise to extensive avoiding power actions.1  The 
premise underlying all avoiding power litigation, namely advancing the 
Bankruptcy Code’s goal of equality of distribution among those who lose 
money when debtors fail, has a particularly pronounced meaning when 
the debtor is (or operates) a Ponzi scheme. 
Although all investors and creditors may be victims, the havoc 
wrought by a Ponzi scheme often falls disproportionately on some.  The 
trustee thus has, and is obliged to pursue, significant recovery claims 
(e.g., avoidance claims) that if taken to judgment and recovery, could 
greatly “balance” the ultimate recoveries out of the Ponzi scheme among 
investors (including investor-transferees), inter se.  This litigation would, 
however, also be expensive, time-consuming and likely frustrating for 
investors, other creditors and perhaps even the court. 
A. MODIFYING TIME FOR PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS 
A motion seeking to modify procedures in bankruptcy (“Procedures 
Motion”) is designed to ameliorate the problems identified above, to the 
extent possible.  The Procedures Motion seeks to streamline the litigation 
process by modifying, and in some respects eliminating, the need for 
individualized review of every case management issue that arises, such 
as extending pleading deadlines, effectuating continuances and making 
discovery more efficient. 
Section 105(a) of Title 11 of the United States Code (“Bankruptcy 
Code”) provides authority for the Procedures Motion. 2  It provides in 
pertinent part: “The court may issue any order, process . . . that is 
necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.”3 
Accordingly, a party requests—through a Procedures Motion—
entry of an order modifying certain procedures governing adversary 
proceedings, including, inter alia, summons issuance, response dates, 
calendaring, status conference hearings, discovery, certain motion 
 1 See Janvey v. Alguire, 647 F.3d 585, 598-99 (5th Cir. 2011); Wyle v. C.H. Rider & Family 
(In re United Energy Corp.), 944 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 2 11 U.S.C.A. § 105 (Westlaw 2012). 
 3 Id. 
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practices and settlement or abandonment of avoidance claims.  Due to 
the large number of adversary proceedings commenced against 
multitudes of defendants in a typical Ponzi scheme in bankruptcy, the 
movant will argue that some of the informal and formal local practices 
should be modified to ease the paper and logistical burdens on the court 
and all parties in interest.  The proposed modified procedures suggested 
below provide a more systematic and efficient manner of managing the 
case load and ensuring that no party in interest will be excluded, 
inadvertently or otherwise, from receiving notice of any potentially 
dispositive action in the adversary proceedings. 
1. Summons Issuance 
In the author’s experience, the Clerk of the Court normally issues a 
summons within two days from the filing of a complaint.  Once the 
summons is issued, the Plaintiff is required to serve it, which places 
statutory and local rule time pressures on the Plaintiff.4  Rule 4(m) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,5 made applicable by Federal Rules of 
Bankruptcy Procedure (“Bankruptcy Rule”) 7004,6 allows a plaintiff 120 
days from the filing of a complaint to serve a summons (which time may 
be expanded for good cause).7  The movant may request that his or her 
counsel be permitted to insert in the summonses submitted to the court an 
issuance date up to sixty days in the future so the complaints can be 
grouped and served in sub-groups.  Extending the issuance dates of the 
summonses will not only allow the movant’s counsel sufficient time to 
prepare for service of the complaints on all the defendants, but it will 
also obviate the potential for having the court’s staff issue dozens of alias 
summonses. 
2. Early Meeting of Counsel 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1) and (f),8 made applicable 
by Bankruptcy Rule 7026,9 govern initial disclosures and meeting 
requirements.  Through a Procedures Motion, the movant may request to 
be excused from these requirements.  In light of the large number of 
defendants in the looming adversary proceedings, which may be located 
 4 See, e.g., Bankr. C.D. Cal. R. 7004-1. 
 5 FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m). 
 6 FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004. 
 7 FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004. 
 8 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f). 
 9 FED. R. BANKR. P. 7026. 
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nationwide, it would be extraordinarily burdensome for the movant’s 
counsel to contact by telephone, or discuss in person, with each and 
every defendant, such matters as exchanging documents, preliminary 
discovery schedules, witness lists, and other evidence reasonably 
available to each party.  At the same time, the actual value of such 
burdensome conferences most likely would be nominal at best.  Instead, 
the movant could suggest that his or her counsel mail a letter to all 
defendants (which letter could be included with the summons and 
complaint).  In the letter, the movant’s counsel could provide a partially 
completed draft of the joint status report setting forth the movant’s 
responses so that each defendant could have all of the information 
required of the movant without unnecessary logistical burdens.  The 
defendants could be asked to complete their respective portion of the 
joint status report without the attendant requirement to communicate by 
person or by phone.  In addition, the letter could provide each defendant 
with a telephone number that defendants (or their counsel) may use to 
leave messages to which the movant’s counsel will timely respond.  The 
movant’s counsel also could invite settlement discussions in the letter 
and inform each defendant of the modifications to procedures 
contemplated by the Procedures Motion. 
3. Initial and Continued Status Conferences 
The Procedures Motion could request that the initial status 
conference for each group of defendants be held on the same date, which 
would be reflected in the summons, and scheduled at least sixty-five days 
after issuance of the summons.  Furthermore, the movant could request 
that the court permit subsequent status conference dates to be utilized as 
a trailing date for continued matters.  This continuation would enable the 
movant to agree to continuances without imposing on the court in each 
case.  Stipulations with opposing counsel would also be simplified.  
Some adversary proceedings against investor defendants will necessarily 
be resolved short of trial; perhaps some will be in a default or settlement 
status, and the balance will either be continued or have discovery cut-off 
dates set.  A trailing continuance date of forty-five days would decrease 
the burden of scheduling and of reported calls to the courtroom deputy 
clerk for continuance requests. 
4. Responses to Adversary Complaints 
The movant may request that the court extend the common thirty-
day response time to forty-five days.  Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 
4
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9006,10 the court may enlarge the time for a response.  The extended 
response date should accommodate the needs of most defendants, 
including out-of-state defendants that need to engage local counsel.  The 
enlargement of time would obviate the need of the movant to enter into 
multiple stipulations extending the time with many defendants.  In 
individual cases where the movant is informed of a reasonable hardship, 
he or she may separately agree to additional, reasonable time to respond. 
5. Extensions of Time to Respond to Complaints 
Although enlarging the time for responding to the complaints 
should minimize the number of defendants requesting extensions of time, 
the movant may request that the court grant the parties authority to enter 
into informal, written extension agreements to extend time to respond, 
provided that no extension of time runs beyond the date one week before 
the initial status conference date absent a specific order of the court.  
Because reasonable extension requests are commonly granted, the 
proposed modification is intended to reduce the number of ministerial 
pleadings flowing through the clerk’s office. 
6. Defaults 
If a defendant fails to interpose a timely response to the adversary 
complaint (and thus has defaulted), the movant may file his or her 
Request for Entry of a Default Judgment and request, at the first status 
conference, for a prove-up hearing.  This way, the Plaintiff can separate 
the default actions from the balance of the actions to permit final 
judgments to be entered pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 7054.11  Such 
proposed modifications will reduce the court’s calendaring time in 
processing default cases.  Additionally, they would provide the 
defendants a second, formal notice of the adversary proceeding, with an 
opportunity to avoid default and file a responsive pleading. 
7.  Discovery 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7026(d),12 as made applicable by 
Bankruptcy Rule 7026,13 provides in pertinent part: “Except . . . when 
authorized under these rules by order or agreement of the parties, a party 
 10 FED. R. BANKR. P. 9006. 
 11 FED. R. BANKR. P. 7054; FED. R. CIV. P. 54. 
 12 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d). 
 13 FED. R. BANKR. P. 7026. 
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may not seek discovery from any source before the parties have 
conferred as required by Rule 26(f).”14  Note that, in the Procedures 
Motion, the movant may seek a modification of the meet and confer 
deadlines as described above in Part I.A.2. 
The movant’s likely intention is to obtain some very basic 
information from the defendants through written discovery to establish 
his or her prima facie case and to learn, as soon as practical, whether a 
defendant has any meaningful defenses or would be unable to pay a 
judgment even if one were obtained.  In order to save mailing costs and 
to expedite the discovery process, the movant may request that he or she 
be permitted to serve limited formal written discovery concurrently with 
the summonses and adversary complaints, provided, for example, that the 
response date will be no earlier than thirty days after the response to the 
complaint is due.  Because the time to answer will be enlarged, 
defendants actually will have more than seventy-five days to respond to 
this basic, written discovery.  In scheduling deadlines, however, the court 
should keep in mind that the defendants are being asked to evaluate the 
complaint, obtain counsel, respond to the complaint, prepare a meet and 
confer report and respond to discovery, all in a relatively short time line. 
B. MODIFYING PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ABANDONMENT 
AND SETTLEMENT 
Avoidance claims against hundreds of defendants can easily arise in 
a Ponzi scheme bankruptcy.  The claims against each defendant 
transferee may range from hundreds of dollars to several hundred 
thousands or millions of dollars.  In addition to the procedural 
modifications discussed above, a movant may also request modifications 
to certain settlement and/or abandonment procedures ordinarily provided 
by applicable rules of practice.  The modified procedures may be used to 
administer claims and adversary actions and reduce litigation expenses 
that are disproportionate to the ultimate possible recovery.  They might, 
for example, establish guidelines whereby avoidance claims can be 
abandoned or compromised through a more efficient process than 
ordinarily attends case-by-case settlements. 
Authority for such a request lies in Bankruptcy Rule 9019(b)15 and 
Bankruptcy Code section 10516 on the grounds that (1) applying the 
ordinary rules to this portfolio of litigation, and (2) requiring the movant 
to file a motion and hold a hearing on the settlement of every avoidance 
 14 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d). 
 15 FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019(b). 
 16 11 U.S.C.A. § 105 (Westlaw 2012). 
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claim would be unduly expensive for the bankruptcy estate and for the 
transferees while unnecessarily burdening the court’s calendar.  
Accordingly, using a proposed settlement formula and procedure would 
protect the interests of the bankruptcy estate, the defendant transferees 
and other general unsecured creditors.  The formula for a proposed 
settlement of avoidance claims should take into account: (1) the 
estimated cost incurred by the bankruptcy estate if litigation were 
pursued, (2) an estimate of the ultimate proposed distribution to all 
creditors, including the defendant transferee, and (3) the status of the 
defendant transferee’s claim in the bankruptcy case. 
First, the Procedures Motion can estimate net recovery to investors 
based on (i) the amounts the estate would expect to recover (after 
discounting for the costs, uncertainties and other vagaries of litigation) if 
the estate pursued all avoidance actions to judgment, and (ii) the 
distribution to each investor if all legitimate claims were recognized and 
allowed.  Then, the Procedures Motion can seek authority to effectuate 
“net deals” built roughly on the premise that investor-defendants are 
entitled to keep the target return calculated under this formula but no 
more, and treating as conceptually irrelevant for these purposes whether 
the target return is achieved by pre-petition transfers or post-petition 
dividends. 
The movant may request an order authorizing, but not requiring, the 
movant to abandon or settle fraudulent transfer or preference claims 
without further order of the court, so long as the abandonment is 
warranted under sound business judgment or if the settlement fits within 
certain parameters based on an approximation of the outcome extensive 
litigation would have had for the defendants, creditors and other 
investors.  Furthermore, the Procedures Motion may seek authorization 
for the movant to exchange a settlement agreement and mutual releases 
with such a defendant transferee, where the settlement meets specified 
court-approved criteria.  Likewise, the Procedures Motion may seek 
authority for the movant to abandon any claim or dismiss any adversary 
proceeding upon implementation of the settlement, without further order 
of the court, including where the defendant has provided evidence that 
the movant believes, with sound business judgment, that costs of 
collection of any judgment weighed against the likelihood of recovery 
from the defendant will not be cost-effective. 
II. SUBSTANTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONSOLIDATION 
Similar to requests for procedural modifications, a Ponzi scheme in 
bankruptcy also provides a unique opportunity for substantive 
consolidation of multiple debtors.  As noted below, substantive 
7
Weiss and Daghbandan: Overcoming Hurdles in Ponzi Scheme Litigation
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2012
648 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
 
consolidation is when all of the assets and liabilities of two or more 
entities become one entity.  It typically occurs when the financial affairs 
of the entities are hopelessly entangled or when separate corporate 
entities have otherwise been disregarded by those in control of the 
debtors.  There are many competing interests a court may evaluate in 
ordering substantive consolidation, that typically involve an intensive 
factual analysis.  Should the court conclude that substantive 
consolidation is inappropriate with respect to a certain set of debtors 
and/or nondebtors, then a movant may suggest administrative 
consolidation in the alternative as a procedural matter to assist in 
streamlining litigation, pleadings, hearings, rulings, etc. 
A. SUBSTANTIVE CONSOLIDATION 
Although not expressly provided for in the Bankruptcy Code, a 
Bankruptcy Court’s power to substantively consolidate estates has been 
part of the Court’s general equitable powers since passage of the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1898.17  Under the Bankruptcy Code, the power 
derives from the equitable powers embodied in section 105.18  The 
primary purpose of substantive consolidation “is to ensure the equitable 
treatment of all creditors.”19  This equitable remedy pierces the corporate 
veil, eliminates inter-company claims, and pools the assets and liabilities 
of once separate entities.20 
The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to adopt a uniform standard for 
substantive consolidation.  However, the circuit courts of appeals have 
articulated three somewhat divergent standards for its application.21  The 
first test is a three-part burden-shifting test announced by the District of 
Columbia Circuit in In re Auto-Train.22  Under this test, a prima facie 
case for substantive consolidation is proven where a movant establishes 
 17 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 55th Cong., 2nd Sess., 30 Stat. 544. 
 18 11 U.S.C.A. § 105 (Westlaw 2012); see Alexander v. Compton (In re Bonham), 229 F.3d 
750, 763-64 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Reider v. F.D.I.C. (In re Reider), 31 F.3d 1102, 1105 (11th Cir. 
1994)); Union Sav. Bank v. Augie/Restivo Baking Co. (In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co.), 860 F.2d 
515, 518 n.1 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 19 In re Bonham, 229 F.3d at 764 (quoting In re Augie/Restivo, 860 F.2d at 518). 
 20 Id. (citations omitted). 
 21 In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 2005); In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co. 860 
F.2d 515; Drabkin v. Midland-Ross Corp. (In re Auto-Train Corp.), 810 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1987).  
Five of the nine circuit courts of appeals that have adopted standards for substantive consolidation 
have applied restrictive tests.  In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195; In re Bonham, 229 F.3d 750; 
Fishell v. U.S. Tr. (In re Fishell), 111 F.3d 131, *2-3 (6th Cir. 1997) (unpublished per curiam 
opinion); Woburn Assocs. v. Kahn (In re Hemingway Transp.), 954 F.2d 1, 32 n.15 (1st Cir. 1992); 
In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co., 860 F.2d 515.  Presumably the remaining circuits apply less 
restrictive standards. 
 22 In re Auto-Train Corp., 810 F.2d at 276. 
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by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) there is substantial identity 
between the entities to be consolidated, and (2) consolidation is 
necessary to avoid some harm or to realize some benefit.23  Creditors are 
then given the opportunity to object to consolidation if they can 
demonstrate that they (1) relied on the separate credit of one of the 
entities, and (2) will be prejudiced by the consolidation.24  Nevertheless, 
the court may overrule an objection and grant substantive consolidation 
if the court determines that the benefits of substantive consolidation 
“heavily” outweigh the harm.25 
Additional tests were outlined in Augie/Restivo26 and Owens 
Corning.27  The Second Circuit in Augie/Restivo created a two-prong test 
where substantive consolidation is granted when (1) creditors dealt with 
the entities as a single economic unit and did not rely on their separate 
identity in extending credit, or (2) the affairs of the debtors are so 
entangled that consolidation will benefit all creditors.28  In 2005, the 
Third Circuit in Owens Corning relied on the Augie/Restivo test in 
creating its own restrictive standard.  The court determined that 
substantive consolidation is applicable only where (1) pre-petition 
creditors disregarded debtors’ corporate separateness so significantly that 
they relied on a breakdown of entity borders and treated them as one 
entity, or (2) the debtors’ post-petition assets and liabilities are so 
scrambled that separating them is prohibitive and will hurt all creditors.29 
Regardless of which standard is applied, the realities of a Ponzi 
scheme often will satisfy all three tests.  A trustee’s investigation into the 
structure and business affairs of a Ponzi scheme will likely uncover 
evidence that affairs of debtor and nondebtor entities used to further the 
Ponzi scheme are so intertwined that consolidation will benefit all 
creditors.  Even the disjunctive restrictive test is satisfied where “the time 
and expense necessary even to attempt to unscramble them [is] so 
substantial as to threaten the realization of any net assets for all the 
creditors or where no accurate identification and allocation of assets is 
possible.”30 
The trustee’s investigation may reveal that the Ponzi scheme entities 
have commingled their funds so that it would be essentially 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Union Sav. Bank v. Augie/Restivo Baking Co. (In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co.), 860 F.2d 
515, 518 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 27 In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 211 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 28 In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co., 860 F.2d at 518. 
 29 In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d at 211. 
 30 Alexander v. Compton (In re Bonham), 229 F.3d 750, 766 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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impracticable, if not impossible, to retrace and break out the assets, 
activities and liabilities of the different entities as part of the overall 
Ponzi scheme as a matter of practice, thus, leaving it highly doubtful that 
professionals could unscramble the debtors’ books and records.  Even the 
possibility that the affairs might be unscrambled may not provide a net 
benefit to the estate if (1) the associated expense will more than likely 
exceed the assets presently on hand in the estate, or (2) if funds become 
available to undertake the task, unscrambling would have little meaning 
for creditors in any event.  Thus, substantive consolidation may be 
proper in a Ponzi scheme in bankruptcy where multiple entities were 
used to support the Ponzi enterprise. 
Recent examples of substantive consolidation in Ponzi scheme 
bankruptcies include West End Financial Advisors LLC31 and Bernard L. 
Madoff (“Madoff”).32  In the substantive consolidation involving the 
Madoff Ponzi scheme, the trustee for Bernard L. Madoff Investment 
Securities LLC (BLMIS) and the trustee of Madoff’s individual chapter 7 
bankruptcy, among others, reviewed the BLMIS and Madoff financial 
affairs and found “a history of payments and transfers from BLMIS to 
Madoff, Madoff’s misuse of BLMIS funds, the intertwining of, and lack 
of a practical manner in which to separate, the financial affairs of Madoff 
and BLMIS.”33  Similar reasoning (i.e., a hopeless commingling of assets 
among multiple entities in a Ponzi scheme) justified substantive 
consolidation in West End Financial Advisors LLC.34 
Nonetheless, prior to requesting substantive consolidation, the 
following practical considerations should be considered: (1) the effect of 
substantive consolidation on creditors, (2) the value of preserving 
transfers between bankruptcy estates for avoidance purposes, and (3) 
possible tax ramifications. 
B. ADMINISTRATIVE CONSOLIDATION 
If the bankruptcy court denies a request to order substantive 
consolidation, a party in interest may alternatively petition for 
administrative consolidation.  Bankruptcy Rule 1015(b)35 specifically 
allows a court to enter an order to jointly administer related bankruptcy 
 31 In re West End Fin. Advisors LLC, No. 11-11152 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2011), ECF 
No. 194 (order directing partial substantive consolidation). 
 32 Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Bernard Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC (In re Bernard L. Madoff), No. 
08-01789 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2009), ECF No. 252 (order granting substantive consolidation). 
 33 Id. at ¶ I. 
 34 In re West End Fin. Advisors LLC, No. 11-11152 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2011), ECF No. 
179 (supplemental application for order directing substantive consolidation ¶¶ 17 and 18). 
 35 FED. R. BANKR. P. 1015(b). 
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cases.36  In a Ponzi scheme, multiple debtors may be related either by 
way of common ownership and control or by the fact that the entities 
were created in one way or another to fund the Ponzi scheme and were 
operated in a way that disguised the fraud. 
If multiple debtors’ business operations and organizations are 
closely related parts of a complex and integrated business structure, joint 
administration of the cases could simplify and substantially reduce the 
costs of separate administration.  For example, joint administration 
would obviate the need for multiple notices, applications and orders 
being served on the same parties.  Additionally, if each creditor has 
already filed claims against the particular debtor that allegedly owes it 
money, then the rights of the debtors’ respective creditors would not be 
adversely affected by joint administration of these cases.  Accordingly, 
administrative consolidation may be in the best interests of the debtors, 
their creditors, equity security holders, limited and general partners, the 
bankruptcy court and the United States Trustee if the court deems 
substantive consolidation improper. 
III. EVIDENTIARY CONCERNS 
This section briefly surveys various evidentiary considerations 
regarding the use of evidence from one Ponzi litigation forum to other 
related proceedings. 
A. ADMISSIONS IN PLEA AGREEMENTS TO PROVE INTENT 
The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held that the existence of a Ponzi 
scheme may be established by the Ponzi operator’s admissions in a plea 
agreement made in connection with criminal prosecution.37  
 36 Bankruptcy Rule 1015(b) provides, in relevant part: 
If a joint petition or two or more petitions are pending in the same court by or against (1) a 
husband and wife, or (2) a partnership and one or more of its general partners, or (3) two or 
more general partners, or (4) a debtor and an affiliate, the court may order a joint 
administration of the estates. Prior to entering an order the court shall give consideration to 
protecting creditors of different estates against potential conflicts of interest. An order 
directing joint administration of individual cases of a husband and wife shall, if one spouse 
has elected the exemptions under §522(b)(2) of the Code and the other has elected the 
exemptions under §522(b)(3), fix a reasonable time within which either may amend the 
election so that both shall have elected the same exemptions. The order shall notify the 
debtors that unless they elect the same exemptions within the time fixed by the court, they 
will be deemed to have elected the exemptions provided by §522(b)(2). 
FED. R. BANKR. P. 1015(b). 
 37 Barclay v. Mackenzie (In re AFI Holding, Inc.), 525 F.3d 700, 704 (9th Cir. 2008); Santa 
Barbara Capital Mgmt. v. Neilson (In re Slatkin), 525 F.3d 805, 814 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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Furthermore, other courts have held that the existence of a Ponzi scheme 
is sufficient to establish actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors 
for purposes of proving fraudulent transfer.38  The Bankruptcy Court for 
the Southern District of Florida relied on this same reasoning in an 
adversary proceeding related to the Rothstein Rosenfeldt Adler, PA 
bankruptcy where the trustee used Ponzi operator Scott Rothstein’s plea 
agreement to establish intent.39  This holding was also recently applied in 
an adversary proceeding related to the Ponzi scheme orchestrated by 
Bernie Madoff.40  Thus, courts nationwide have adopted the general 
principle that admissions made in a Ponzi operator’s plea agreement are 
sufficient to establish actual intent to
B. HEARSAY PROBLEMS WITH WITNESS UNAVAILABILITY 
Nevertheless, any practitioner seeking to use the Ponzi operator’s 
admissions in his or her plea agreement to establish intent must be 
prepared to address evidentiary issues arising from the nature of the plea 
agreement.  Technically, the plea agreement and resulting judgment 
order are hearsay because they are being used for the truth of the matters 
asserted, namely that the Ponzi operator ran the debtor as a Ponzi scheme 
and had the actual intent to defraud creditors.41  Yet, the plea agreement 
and judgment order are admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 
803(22),42 which allows hearsay evidence of a “‘final judgment, entered 
after a trial or upon a plea of guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo 
contendre), adjudging a person guilty of a crime punishable by death or 
imprisonment in excess of one year, to prove any fact essential to sustain 
the judgment . . . .’”43 
 38 In re AFI Holding, Inc., 525 F.3d at 704; Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Res. Dev. Int’l, LLC, 
487 F.3d 295, 301 (5th Cir. 2007); Picard v. Estate of Chais (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. 
LLC), 445 B.R. 206, 220 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“It is now well recognized that the existence of a 
Ponzi scheme establishes that transfers were made with the intent to hinder, delay and defraud 
creditors.”) (citations omitted). 
 39 Stettin v. Adler (In re Rothstein Rosenfeldt Adler, P.A.), No. 09-34791-BKC-RBR, 2010 
WL 5173796, *5 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Dec. 14, 2010) (citing In re Slatkin, 525 F.3d at 811-12) 
(“Criminal plea agreements are admissible to establish the existence of a Ponzi scheme and a 
wrongdoer’s fraudulent intent.”). 
 40 In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 445 B.R. at 220-21 (citing Bear, Stearns Sec. Corp. 
v. Gredd (In re Manhattan Inv. Fund Ltd.), 397 B.R. 1, 8-14 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007)). 
 41 See FED. R. EVID. 801(c). 
 42 FED. R. EVID. 803(22). 
 43 Rosen v. Neilson (In re Slatkin), 310 B.R. 740, 745 (C.D. Cal. 2004); Scholes v. Lehmann, 
56 F.3d 750, 762 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding plea agreement admissible under Rule 803(22) in a 
fraudulent transfer suit brought by receiver against various third parties). 
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Alternatively, a plea agreement may be admissible under Federal 
Rule of Evidence 807,44 the “residual” or “catch-all” exception to the 
hearsay rule.  This rule provides: 
A statement not specifically covered by Rule 803 or 804 but having 
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is not 
excluded by the hearsay rule, if the court determines that (A) the 
statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is 
more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other 
evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; 
and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice 
will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. 
The Ninth Circuit applied this rule in deeming the Ponzi operator’s plea 
agreement admissible in In re Slatkin.45  Likewise, in 2011, the 
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York applied this 
reasoning to admit admissions made in Madoff’s plea agreement.46 
C. COORDINATION WITH GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES 
In a Ponzi scheme context, the bankruptcy trustee, court-appointed 
receiver and a government entity may enter into coordination agreements 
to facilitate cooperation among multiple entities where each has a role 
related to judicial resolution of the Ponzi scheme.  Coordination among 
these parties is necessary in the Ponzi context because violations of both 
criminal and civil laws have occurred with the additional overlay of 
bankruptcy laws.  Such agreements generally aim to facilitate collection 
and distribution of fraudulently obtained funds to Ponzi scheme victims.  
The ultimate goal of coordination is to minimize the potential for 
expensive litigation. “In every possible instance, the absence of 
coordination among the various parties in these cases will diminish the 
recovery of the victims and creditors of this fraud.”47  Coordination 
agreements allow multiple parties to collaborate to resolve creditors’ and 
investors’ claims against already limited resources, and reduce the extent 
 44 FED. R. EVID. 807. 
 45 Santa Barbara Capital Mgmt. v. Neilson (In re Slatkin), 525 F.3d 805, 812 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 46 Picard v. Estate of Chais (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC), 445 B.R. 206, 221 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 47 In re Petters Co., No. 08-45257 (Bankr. D. Minn. Aug. 18, 2010), ECF No. 407 (motion 
seeking approval of Petters Coordination Agreement ¶ 37); In re Petters Co., No. 08-45257 (Bankr. 
D. Minn. Sept. 14, 2010), ECF No. 453 (order approving Petters Coordination Agreement).  Tom 
Petters was found guilty in December 2009 of twenty felony counts relating to fraud, money 
laundering and conspiracy in connection with originating a $3.65 billion Ponzi scheme. 
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to which the parties to the agreement must compete against each other to 
obtain and distribute the same assets. 
A coordination agreement was particularly useful in the Dreier LLP 
bankruptcy, which resulted from a Ponzi scheme originated by the law 
firm’s sole equity partner, Marc Dreier.48  In Dreier LLP, chapter 11 
trustee Sheila M. Gowan (“Trustee Gowan”) and the United States 
Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York (“USAO-
SDNY”) successfully negotiated a coordination agreement whereby the 
USAO-SDNY and Trustee Gowan agreed to divide the debtor law firm’s 
assets between the forfeiture and bankruptcy proceedings.49  The thrust 
of the agreement was to prevent the USAO-SDNY from seeking 
forfeiture of funds obtained by Trustee Gowan through avoidance actions 
in bankruptcy.  Because the USAO-SDNY agreed to forbear from 
forfeiting the proceeds of certain avoidance actions, Trustee Gowan was 
able to distribute the proceeds of these actions to creditors.50 
CONCLUSION 
Ponzi schemes provide unique evidentiary, procedural and 
administrative challenges in the bankruptcy context.  As more of these 
schemes inevitably find their way into bankruptcy, the strategies 
discussed in this Article can aid practitioners and courts in navigating 
through the minefield of Ponzi schemes in bankruptcy. 
 48 In re Dreier LLP, No. 08-15051 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2010), ECF No. 337 (trustee’s 
motion for approval of agreements, Exh. B. Coordination Agreement).  Court approval of a revised 
coordination agreement was entered on June 9, 2010.  In re Dreier LLP, No. 08-15051 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. June 9, 2010), ECF No. 610. 
 49 Coordination Agreement ¶¶ 2-6, In re Dreier LLP, No. 08-15051 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 
28, 2010), ECF No. 337.  Specifically, the agreement provided that the USAO-SDNY “shall not seek 
to forfeit or assert a right with respect to the proceeds of any actions seeking to avoid fraudulent 
transfers or preferences brought by the Chapter 11 Trustee against the persons and entities identified 
in the attached Schedule 2.”  Id. at ¶ 4. 
 50 In re Dreier LLP, No. 08-15051 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2010), ECF No. No. 337 
(trustee’s motion for approval of agreements, Exh. B. Coordination Agreement). 
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